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The Development and Evaluation of
Judicial Review
By C. PERRY PATTERSOx
The University of Texas
I. Introduction
The doctrine of judicial review is as much a principle of the Con-
stitution as the principle of federalism or the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances. It is a far more definite
power than the powers of Congress or those of the President. It
should be remembered that the Constitution nowhere mentions fed-
eralism, separation of powers, checks and balances, national su-
premacy or concurrent powers, taxation for only a public purpose,
business affected with a public interest is subject to regulation,
contracts involving governmental powers are null and void, neither
the national government nor the states can tax the instrumentali-
ties of the other, and the doctrine of implied powers, yet no one
can doubt that these are principles of the Constitution. The fact
that they are not specifically mentioned is no argument at all that
they are not in the Constitution. How have they been discovered?
By judicial interpretation. What valid reason is there for the un-*
equivocal and complete acceptance of these principles derived
from the language of the Constitution and the rejection of the prin-
ciple of judicial review which is even more definitely a funda-
mental principle of the Constitution. Indeed without which the
other principles of the Constitution could not have been derived.
H. History of Judicial Review
1. Judicial Review Was a Practice of English. and
Colonial Courts Prior to the Revolution.
The doctrine of judicial review is much older than the Consti-
tution and has always been regarded as a part of a fundamental
law. It was practiced by English courts as a check upon an arbi-
trary monarch prior to the establishment of parliamentary sov-
ereignty. It was then superseded by legislative supremacy. It
must be remembered in this connection that in theory and law
Parliament is the High Court of Parliament and that its upper
house, the House of Lords, is still the supreme court of the king-
dom in both civil and criminal matters. Legislation in the proc-
ess of its enactment with the exception of budgetary legislation
must have the approval of this supreme court unless the matter
in controversy is specifically submitted to the people in a general
election and sometimes in two or three elections. Moreover, legis-
lation in Great Britain is always framed by the Parliamentary
Council which is composed of distinguished barristers. Private
bills are almost completely controlled by the House of Lords be-
cause they are considered to be a judicial matter and a fee is
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charged for this consideration. It can, therefore, be very accur-
ately stated that English legislation passes judicial review in the
process of its enactment. It must be approved by a supreme
court whose personnel holds for life. The same court is the final
interpreter of this legislation.
Throughout the colonial period of our history the acts of the
colonial assemblies were reviewed by the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council and by the Courts of Westminster to see if
they were in pursuance of the charters of the colonies and the
laws of England-these two constituting the supreme law of the
colonies. There were approximately 8823 acts of the colonial as-
semblies submitted to these bodies in the period from 1696 to 1782
(eighty-six years) and more than 600 were held null and void.
This is a rather formidable record for judicial review as com-
pared with the seventy-seven out of 55,000 acts of Congress over
a period of 150 years under a much more rigid constitution-
less than 1/8,000%-and possibly less than 1/16,000% of measures
of major significance.
2. Revolution a Result of Legislative Supremacy
and a Lack of Judicial Review.
The forefathers, therefore, were, even during the colonial days,
very familiar with the doctrine of judicial review. They were also
familiar with the principle of legislative supremacy so far as the
acts of Parliament applied to them. The British Empire was like
the late German Republic. There was judicial review of the acts
of local or state governments but not of the acts of the general or
central government. The results in both instances was a tyranny
on the part of the general government. In Germany the states
were abolished and in the British Empire a revolution to prevent
the destruction of local self-government or state rights. This
revolution was a revolt from legislative supremacy. It was the
many Navigation Acts, the Molasses Act of 1733, the Sugar Act
of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townsend Acts of 1767, and
the Intolerable Acts of 1774 that caused the Revolution. Because
of the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty and legislative su-
premacy there was no escape from these acts except revolution.
3. Constitutional Supremacy Substituted for
Legislative Supremacy.
After the Revolution in the establishments of governments rest-
ing on the consent of the governed it was hardly to be expected
that the forefathers would provide the principle of legislative
supremacy. How was a government to be established without the
use of a legislative body? It had never been done. There was
not one such government in existence. How was Jefferson's
philosophy of the Declaration to be realized? After considerable
experimentation, Massachusetts, in making her third constitution
in 1780, discovered the formula. What was it? It was to have a
constitutional convention composed of delegates elected by the
people for the specific purpose to propose a constitution, submit
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it to the people for ratification, and adjourn sine die. The people
then in their original sovereignty at the ballot box enacted a funda-
mental law. Here is where legislative supremacy was superseded
by a fundamental law and judicial review was established to main-
tain it. In rapid process the constitutional convention was used
in the other states as the means of revising their constitutions
and establishing the principle of popular sovereignty and judicial
review as its agent. In this way legislative supremacy was abol-
ished from American soil and the state courts under these new
constitutions began to declare the acts of state legislatures un-
constitutional.
4. The Exercise of Judicial Review by State Courts Prior to
1787 as a Principle of Constitutional Supremacy
There were several cases in which state courts exercised this
power before the meeting of the Federal Convention of 1787.
Among the most important are Holmes v. Walton (1780), a New
Jersey case; Commonwealth v. Caton (1782), a Virginia case;
Trevitt v. Weeden (1786), a Rhode Island case; and Bayard v.
Singleton (1787), a North Carolina case. It is significant that
in the Virginia ease of Commonwealth v. Caton that Justice Wythe,
John Marshall's law professor of William and Mary and later a
delegate to the Federal Convention, had this to say in his opinion:
"If the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated,
should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them
by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers at my seat, in this
tribunal; and pointing to the Constitution, will say to
them, here is the limit of your authority, and hither shall
you go, but no further."
5. Judicial Review Approved by the Congress of
the Confederation.
On March 21, 1787, just a few weeks before the Federal Con-
vention met, Congress, having had trouble with Great Britain
because the states were violating the treaty of 1783, asked the
states to empower their courts to nullify the acts of the state
legislatures in violation of this treaty. It worked out a resolution
which it asked every legislature of the states to pass, and which
reads as follows:
Therefore .. . it is hereby enacted . . . that such of
the acts or parts of acts of the legislature of this state,
as are repugnant to the treaty of peace between the
United States and his Britannic Majesty, or any article
thereof, shall be, and hereby are repealed. And further,
that the courts of law and equity within this state be,
and they hereby are directed and required in all causes
and questions cognizable by them respectively, and arising
from or touching the said treaty, to decide and adjudge
according to the tenor, true intent, and meaning of the
same, anything in the said acts, or parts of acts, to the
contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.
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Here you will notice that the state constitution and treaties
would be the supreme law of the land. The state courts, the
only courts in existence at this time, were to nullify all legis-
lative acts in contravention of state constitutions and treaties.
At this time the states had the sole power of legislation; the old
Congress could not legislate. All of its acts had to be approved
by the states to have the effect of law and thereby became the
acts of the states. By 1787 judicial review had been established
by the states and was being exercised by state courts. The supreme
law of the land clause later placed in the Constitution of the
United States had been suggested by making state constitutions
and treaties superior to legislative acts. The resolution of Con-
gress had advertised judicial review to all the members of the
thirteen legislatures. The doctrine of judicial review was well
known in 1787 and was not established by a coup d'etat of the
Federal Convention of 1787 or by John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison.
6. Judicial Review Approved by the Federal Convention of
1787 as a Means of Preventing Legislative Supremacy.
It is not surprising to find that in the New Jersey proposal
for the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787 in which
state in the case of Holmes v. Walton an act of the legislature
was held unconstitutional and in which case William Paterson,
David Brearly and William Livingston had participated-all later
delegates to the Federal Convention-that Article 3 of this pro-
posal read as follows: "The acts of Congress and treaties to be
the supreme law of the land, the acts of the state legislatures to
the contrary notwithstanding." Here is the germ of the supreme
law of the land clause which is now Article VI of the Constitution
of the United States. Throughout the debates of the Federal Con-
vention on this clause and in the state ratifying conventions it
was repeatedly stated by various members of these conventions
that the courts would nullify acts of Congress or of the state
legislatures when they conflicted with the supreme law.
Many of the most able members of the Convention, including
Madison, Hamilton, James Wilson, Governeur Morris. Ellsworth,
and Mason, wanted to make a further use of the judges by as-
sociating them with the President in a Council of Revision to
which all acts of Congress and of the states would have to be
submitted before they went into effect. This Council of Re-
vision was proposed four times and was defeated each time. These
proponents were afraid of the legislature and did not think that
judicial review was an adequate check.
It was the fact that judicial review had already been provided
that defeated this proposal. Luther Martin, a delegate from
Maryland, in opposing this proposal said:
"And as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point
will come before the Judges in their official character.
In this character they have a negative on the laws. Join
them with the Executive in the Revision, and they will
have a double negative."
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Morris, in support of the Council of Revision said:
"He concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater
danger from legislative usurpation than from any other
source. It had been said that the Legislature ought to
be relied on as the proper guardian of liberty. The
answer was short and conclusive. Either bad laws will
be pushed or not. On the latter supposition, no check
will be wanted. On the former, a strong check will be
necessary. And this is the proper supposition. Emis-
sions of paper money, largesses to the people-a remission
of debt, and similar measures, will at some time be pop-
ular, and will be pushed for that reason. At other times,
such measures will coincide with the interests of the Legis-
latures themselves, and that will be a reason not less
cogent for pushing them. It may be thought that the
people will not be deluded and misled in the latter case.
But experience teaches another reason."
Gerry of Massachusetts opposed the Council, saying:
"They (the judges) will have a sufficient check against
encroachments of their own department by their exposi-
tion of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on
their constitutionality."
Mason, in replying to Gerry, said that:
"He would reply that in this capacity they could
impede, in one case only, the operation of laws. They
could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with
regard to every law, however unjust, oppressive or per-
nicious, which did not come plainly under this descrip-
tion, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give
it a free course. He wished the further use to be made
of the Judges, of giving aid in preventing every improper
law."
It must be noticed in this debate that both the opponents and
proponents of the Council of Revision admit the fact of judicial
review. It is not judicial review that is being debated but the
Council of Revision. The defeat of the proposal of the Council
of Revision in no way changed the status of judicial review. The
Council of Revision was a collective form of veto because at this
stage of the proceedings of the convention the members were not
willing to give the veto to the President alone.
7. The Linking of a Fundamental Law and Judicial Review
by James Madison and Its Approval by the
Federal Convention.
When the question of how the Constitution was to be ratified,
whether by state legislatures or by conventions, came up in the
Federal Convention, Madison said the state legislatures were in-
competent for the purpose because the ratification of the Consti-
tution would radically change every state constitution in the Re-
public. This would mean that the state legislatures would change
the constitutions under which they held their powers and that
they would be the creators of the Constitution of the United States.
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This would make the state legislatures supreme over both the
national and state constitutions. This would establish legislative
rather than constitutional supremacy.
Madison said that "He considered the difference between a
system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the
people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and
a constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be
as inviolable as the latter. In point of political operation, there
were two important distinctions in favor of the latter. (1) A law
violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be respected
by the judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A lau
violating a constitution established by, the people themselves, would
be considered by the judges as null and void. (2) The doctrine laid
down by the law of nations in the case of treaties is that a breach
of any one article by any of the parties, frees the other parties
from their engagements. In the case of a union of people under
one constitution, the nature of the pact has always been under-
stood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two
modes in point of expediency he thought all the considerations
which recommended this Convention in preference to Congress
for proposing the reform were in favor of state conventions in
preference to the legislatures for examining and adopting it."
Madison plainly states that if the Constitution was ratified by
state conventions rather than by state legislatures, it would estab-
lish a "union of people" and that "A law violating a constitution
established by the people themselves, would be considered by the
judges as null and void."
What happened? The Convention unanimously accepted Madi-
son's proposal as the proper method of ratification. The Con-
stitution was referred to state conventions elected by the people
to ratify it for them. The Constitution was ratified by state
conventions, a union of people was established, the Constitution was
made a fundamental law enacted by the American people in their
original sovereignty, was made "inviolable" and judicial review
was established to maintain it against legislative infraction.
(Continued in next issue)
